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Policy recommendations
evaluation, the European Union should assist the re-
cipient country with EPF-funded WAM assistance pro-
grammes, which build on initiatives that already work 
closely together with the relevant local actors.
\ Involve the European Parliament 
The European Parliament should be involved in dis-
cussing the use of the EPF to fund arms transfers to 
avoid democratic legitimacy problems and improve the 
accountability of such transfers. 
\ Create a mechanism for affected  
populations to report complaints and 
grievances
People living in the countries that receive arms from 
Europe are most affected by decisions made by the 
EPF. To ensure that the European Union remains ac-
countable for their decisions and cases of misuse, it 
should establish a mechanism for affected civilians in 
recipient countries to report complaints and grievanc-
es resulting from European arms transfers. 
\ Make clear and public which arms and 
military equipment are transferred to 
whom and why
All European Peace Facility (EPF)-funded transfers of 
arms and other military equipment should be trans-
parent and well justified. The European Union should 
issue a biannual public report about all EPF-funded 
arms transfers, including information on the type, 
number, condition and effective end-user of the arms. 
In addition, the reports should include a detailed expla-
nation of the reasons for each transfer.
\ Introduce post-shipment controls
To reduce the risk of diversion, the European Union 
should introduce post-shipment controls for arms 
and military equipment that were funded via the EPF. 
End-use certificates for such transfers should include 
the permission for officials from the European Union, 
e.g. from the European External Action Service, or EU 
member states, to conduct such on-the-spot checks.
\ Support weapons and ammunition 
management in recipient countries
Transfers of EPF-funded arms and other military equip-
ment should be tied to a compulsory evaluation of the 
existing structures of weapons and ammunition man-
agement (WAM). Depending on the results of this 
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Introduction
The Council of the European Union (EU) is currently 
discussing the establishment of a European Peace  
Facility (EPF), an off-budget fund, potentially worth 
€5 billion. The EPF’s aim is to 
1\ fund the common costs of military missions and 
operations under the EU Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP); 
2\ fund military peace support operations led by 
international partners on a global scale; 
3\ finance transfers of armaments and further mili-
tary equipment and infrastructure to third coun-
tries as a form of capacity-building.
The Treaty on European Union does not allow the  
Union’s budget to be used to finance expenditure 
with military or defence implications, which is why 
the EPF is not a part of the EU’s Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF), but would run alongside it for the 
period 2021-2027. What remains unclear is how the 
EPF will be operationalised. This Policy Brief focusses 
on the third aim of the EPF and makes concrete sug-
gestions for how to go about the financing of arms 
transfers to third countries.
Supporting security forces in third countries with 
training and/or military equipment is reasonable if it 
helps to strengthen a legitimised monopoly of force 
that improves peoples’ sense of security in their 
country. However, arms transfers in the name of  
capacity-building are accompanied by significant 
risks and problems. Where the legitimacy of the secu-
rity forces is in doubt, their human rights record poor 
and civilian oversight and democratic control mecha-
nisms are missing, there is a high risk that trans-
ferred armaments will be misused by the military 
and the security forces. 
Another risk is the diversion of delivered armaments 
in the recipient country or region. High levels of cor-
ruption increase the likelihood of arms being resold, 
e.g. by military personnel on the black market. There 
is also the risk of illegal re-export to armed actors in 
other countries or looting/theft from unsecured 
weapons depots. In recipient countries with violent 
conflicts, state security forces might be overrun by 
armed groups who will take their arms and other 
military equipment. In other words, the risks may  
be high that transferred arms are involved in severe 
human rights violations and worsen the security  
situation abroad. 
If the EU wants to reduce these risks when it finances 
arms transfers to third countries via the EPF–with  
European taxpayers’ money–it will have to put strong 
safeguards in place. If this is done, the EPF could 
function as a role model for responsible and account-
able arms export control of the EU and its member 
states. This Policy Brief recommends adopting five 
safeguards for the EPF to ensure that the new fund 
fosters transparency in its financing of arms trans-
fers, reduces diversion by supporting weapons and 
ammunition management initiatives and by intro-
ducing post-shipment controls. It also promotes 
democratic and civic control of arms transfers by  
including the voices of the European Parliament and 
civilians affected by these transfers.
Five ways to make the European Peace Facility a  
role model for arms export control  
Box 1  
European Peace Facility
The European Peace Facility (EPF) was proposed by former High Repre-
sentative (HR) Federica Mogherini in June 2018. As a Council Decision 
under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the proposed 
EPF will draw together existing off-budget mechanisms (namely Athe-
na and the African Peace Facility) and seek to complement and support 
the EU’s external actions in peace and security. Notably, the EPF will 
permit the EU to invest in building the capacity of third-country secu-
rity forces, which includes infrastructure, equipment and military 
assistance. 
A committee composed of member states’ representatives will be in 
charge of budgets and accounts. The High Representative (HR), with 
support of the European External Action Service and the assistance of 
the Commission’s Service for the Foreign Policy Instruments, will en-
sure its implementation. The Council or the Political and Security Com-
mittee, acting unanimously on proposals from the HR, will decide on 
programmes and projects.  
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Make clear and public which arms and 
military equipment are transferred to 
whom and why
EU-funded arms transfers in the context of the pro-
posed EPF should be transparent and well justified. 
Several previous arms exports by EU member states 
have backlashed and resulted in public scandals. In 
Mexico, for example, Heckler & Koch- German-made 
arms were used by the police in the state of Guerrero 
to oppress a student demonstration in 2011, killing 
two protesters. Bulgarian-manufactured machine 
guns and rockets exported to the Iraqi military and 
security forces between 2005 and 2011 fell into the 
hands of Islamist fighters. The EU can foster trans-
parency through the proposed EPF by detailing and 
making public the type of support provided to a third 
country. This includes the type, number, condition 
and effective end-user of EPF-funded and transferred 
arms. Furthermore, the EU should use the establish-
ment of the EPF to introduce a transparent justifica-
tion mechanism for arms transfer decisions. Knowing 
the reasons for such a decision is the basis for inde-
pendent oversight by parliaments and civil society.  
A fair assessment of an arms transfer based on the EU’s 
own criteria is possible only if information on what 
exactly is transferred to whom, and why is available. 
In 2008, the legally binding successor to the 1998 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the EU Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining 
common rules governing control of exports of mili-
tary technology and equipment (hereafter Common 
Position) came into force. The Common Position sets 
out eight criteria1  for the assessment of arms export 
licences by member states and is accompanied by an 
annual report about EU arms exports. While this report 
contains information on the financial volume of li-
censes for arms exports, it does not provide informa-
tion on the exact type of arms and the de facto 
end-user (military, police, other security forces). Every 
decision about an EPF funded arms transfer must be 
1 \  These criteria include, among others, respect for human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law in the recipient country, internal conflicts, regional 
peace, security and stability and the danger of illicit re-export and diversion.
in line with the Common Position. However, the struc-
ture of current reports does not allow to independently 
assess compliance with the Common Position’s crite-
ria because they do not provide enough information 
about European arms exports. This is why the EPF 
needs its own reporting system that details the type of 
support provided to a third country. In doing so, the EU 
would set standards for arms transfer reporting obliga-
tions, perhaps also supporting the discussion concern-
ing the current inconsistency of its member states’ an-
nual export reports. It could issue a biannual public 
report about all EPF-funded arms transfers to third 
countries. In addition to the information on the arms 
and end-users, these reports should also include a de-
tailed explanation of every transfer and state why it is 
in line with the eight criteria of the Common Position. 
A new reporting system of EPF-funded arms transfers 
would not change the fact that final decisions on ex-
ports are taken at the national level. The added value of 
a new system is to make public all information neces-
sary for an independent evaluation of EPF-funded arms 
transfers. This transparency respects the right of Euro-
pean taxpayers to information about how their money 
is spent. Furthermore, it helps the EU and its member 
states to improve their use of EPF funds as independent 
assessments of the arms transfers, e.g. by researchers 
and civil society organisations, provide important 
knowledge that can inform decision-making on which 
arms transfers should or should not be funded by the 
EPF. Hiding this decision-making process from the  
European citizens could instead delegitimise the EPF.
Introduce post-shipment controls
Arms diversion is a widespread problem, especially in 
conflict-ridden countries: The UK-based organisation 
Conflict Armament Research documented more than 
11,000 cases of arms diversion in 23 conflict-affected 
countries for the period 2011 to 2018, which includes 
more than 500,000 units of weapons and related 
matériel. These weapons frequently end up in the 
hands of non-state armed groups, undermining 
states’ monopoly on the use of force and increasing 
the danger of violence committed against civilians. 
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in the recipient country. WAM is defined as the over-
sight and management of arms and ammunition 
throughout their lifecycle, including the establish-
ment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe 
and secure acquisition, storage, transfers, tracing, and 
disposal of armaments. It is generally known that 
weak WAM structures significantly hinder peace,  
security and development. Not only can inadequate 
WAM contribute to the misuse of arms and ammuni-
tion by security forces, it can also lead to diversion 
and, therefore, enable urban violence, displacement, 
human rights violations and organised crime. 
Many countries that could benefit from the military 
capacity-building component of the EPF do not fulfil 
international standards for WAM. In combination 
with high levels of corruption, this can lead to mili-
tary personnel reselling imported arms on the black 
market or to security forces “borrowing” state-owned 
arms for personal use. Additionally, if sites were se-
cured, this would prevent non-military staff from 
looting and stealing arms on a smaller scale. 
To tackle this problem, the EU should link EPF-fund-
ed arms transfers to a compulsory evaluation (base-
line assessment) of existing WAM structures on-site. 
Depending on the results of this evaluation, the EU 
should assist the recipient country in improving 
their WAM structures. EPF funds should be available 
to fund the assessments and assistance programmes. 
Such programmes could, for example, aim at 
strengthening domestic legal frameworks governing 
arms, ammunition and their management or physi-
cal security and stockpile management (PSSM)2 . The 
EPF can build on programmes and projects that al-
ready work closely together with relevant local actors 
to improve their capabilities in overseeing, managing 
and controlling their arms. Improving WAM and na-
tional compliance with international standards will 
reduce the risk of diversion of military equipment. 
The EU would not even have to start from scratch, but 
 
 
2 \  PSSM aims at securing arms, establishing transparent holdings,and trac-
ing the circulation of weapons. It includes measures to foster the reliabil-
ity of armouries and inventory practices, e.g. through marking and regis-
tration of weapons, or the destruction of surplus and defective weapons.
For example, in 2011, rebels in Libya fighting the 
Gaddafi regime used ammunition that the Swiss 
company RUAG had sold to Qatar in 2009. The Qatari 
government declared it had evaded the ban on re-ex-
porting Swiss ammunition “in error”. Only one year 
later, the Free Syrian Army fighting the government 
of Bashar al-Assad reportedly possessed Swiss-made 
hand grenades. These grenades could be traced back 
to a sale to the United Arab Emirates in 2003/2004, 
which included a clause not to re-export the grenades 
to countries at war. A joint investigation of Switzer-
land and the United Arab Emirates showed that the 
grenades had been transferred to Jordan, from where 
they were re-exported to Turkey and then to Syria. 
These cases prompted the Swiss government to intro-
duce post-shipment controls in 2013. 
To reduce the risk of diversion, the EU should follow 
this example and introduce post-shipment controls 
for arms transfers funded by the EPF. This entails on-
site checks in the recipient country that go beyond 
ex-ante risk assessments carried out mainly by Euro-
pean headquarters. When arms transfers are to be 
funded from the EPF, end-use certificates should in-
clude the permission for officials from the EU, e.g. 
from the European External Action Service or EU 
member states, to conduct such on-the-spot checks. 
Proof of non-compliance with the end-use certificate 
or refusals of the formerly granted controls should be 
sanctioned, e.g. by excluding the respective country 
from further EPF-funded arms transfers for the next 
three years. As post-shipment controls are still the ex-
ception concerning arms exports, the EPF would make 
a significant contribution to raising awareness of the 
necessity to control whether transferred arms are still 
in the intended end-user’s possession and used for the 
intended purpose. Currently, only one EU member 
state, Germany, has introduced post-shipment controls.
Support weapons and ammunition 
management in recipient countries
The EU must consider potential diversion of 
EPF-funded arms as a result of insufficient structures 
for weapons and ammunition management (WAM) 
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Create a complaints mechanism for  
affected populations
Democratic checks and control mechanisms of the 
EPF should go beyond EU institutions and citizens. 
The EU should create a mechanism that facilitates the 
reporting of complaints and grievances by affected 
populations, i.e. those in the recipient countries, as 
they will be chiefly affected by decisions under the 
EPF. Equipping third countries’ armed and security 
forces comes with the caveat of aggravating security 
situations there when it leads to increased violence 
against civilians and human rights violations. There-
fore, if the EU wants to fully acknowledge the risks 
that come with equipping third countries, it should 
create a platform that collects and documents griev-
ances of the population in the recipient countries. The 
best-known EU complaints mechanism—the Europe-
an Ombudsman—will not be available to complain-
ants from recipient countries. However, the European  
Parliament could appoint another representative who 
has to report to Parliament as is established practice 
for the existing Ombudsman’s office. This mechanism 
must be independent, impartial, transparent and easily 
accessible. Since the EU has already stated that there 
will be oversight mechanisms regarding the potential 
misuse of funded arms, the proposed mechanism for 
affected populations is one of several possible options 
that would reinforce the EU’s accountability and 
credibility in promoting peace. 
could rather lean on existing expertise and struc-
tures, using its resources efficiently whilst at the 
same time supporting actors who are already work-
ing in this field.
Involve the European Parliament
As an instrument with defence and military implica-
tions, the EPF should be backed up by democratic and 
civil controls. Regular checks whether transferred 
arms and other military equipment are used as de-
clared could strengthen the EU’s role in sustainable 
peace promotion. This is why the proposed EPF 
should entrench a guarantee of democratic control by 
integrating the European Parliament in the discussion 
about arms transfer decisions. Assuring parliamentary 
checks helps mitigate democratic legitimacy problems 
and improves the accountability of arms transfers 
under the EPF. 
In its official recommendation from March 2019, 
members of the European Parliament asked to be reg-
ularly briefed by the Council and the HR on decisions 
taken under the EPF and on its general implementa-
tion. They also recommended that Parliament’s views 
be taken into account when preparing proposals for 
programmes. Despite wanting to be involved, the  
European Parliament’s role in the ongoing negotiations 
of the EPF has been minimal so far, and it remains to 
be seen whether it will be playing any role at all. As 
the EPF will be established as a CFSP instrument, the 
European Parliament will have no formal oversight 
role, and in such a case, budgetary powers lack a legal 
base in the Treaty on European Union. However, it is 
an established practice in other off-budget instruments 
to integrate Parliament in their structures: For exam-
ple, in the context of the European Development 
Fund, Parliament is granted discharge powers, and its 
members are regularly briefed on its implementation. 
This should also be the case for arms transferred  
under the EPF, where representatives of the EPF from 
the Council should explain and discuss their decisions 
in the European Parliament. 
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